Poland’s President signs law introducing larger-plant biomethane auctions and direct-pipeline rules
Poland’s President signed the amendment to the Renewable Energy Sources (RES) Act, developed as UD332 on 15 October 2026. The legislation addresses two different investment barriers: the absence of dedicated operating support for larger biomethane projects, and restrictive arrangements for supplying renewable gases directly to customers. Presidential assent marks a significant legislative milestone, while implementation of the auction mechanism and direct-pipeline framework remains subject to the Act’s staggered commencement provisions.[1]
Poland introduced biomethane feed-in-premium (FIP) support through the August 2023 RES amendment. That framework covered installations up to 1 MW of electrical-equivalent capacity, leaving larger projects without the same dedicated operating-support route. The new auction mechanism addresses that gap.[2]
The reform also follows an interrupted legislative attempt. Biomethane provisions were included in the wider wind-energy legislation vetoed on 21 August 2025. The Presidency’s account confirms that these provisions were caught within the rejected package, although the stated objections concerned wind-farm siting.[3]
The existing market remains at an early stage of implementation: URE issued its first biomethane FIP certificate on 24 September 2026, the same day the Senate accepted the Act. The auction reform therefore expands a support architecture whose practical deployment has only recently begun.[5]
Capacity is measured as an electrical equivalent
The reform addresses the support gap for biomethane plants above 1 MWe of electrical-equivalent capacity. Auction categories are below 2 MWe and at least 2 MWe, calculated using an assumed 41% electrical efficiency. Article 83t sets no explicit 1 MWe eligibility minimum, and electricity generation is not required.[6]
Electrical-equivalent capacity at an assumed 41% electrical efficiency; electricity generation is not required. Shaded band: Article 83t sets no explicit 1 MWe eligibility minimum.
Producers compete for a supported price, then sell their gas
URE administers the auctions. The mechanism combines project prequalification, competitive bidding and subsequent settlement of the difference between the supported price and a gas-market benchmark.[7]
Support can run for up to 20 years. When the gas-market benchmark exceeds the adjusted auction price, the positive balance offsets future support, with outstanding amounts subject to repayment. Producers retain exposure to any difference between their negotiated selling price and the statutory benchmark.[8]
Capital grants reduce the operating-support price
The law allows operating support to coexist with investment aid, but investment aid reduces the price used to calculate auction support. A grant can reduce upfront financing needs while also reducing subsequent operating payments.[9]
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Illustrative figures, excluding indexation and other settlement adjustments. Default view: winning price 400, investment-aid adjustment −20, benchmark 180.
The pipeline reform covers biogas, agricultural biogas and biomethane. It therefore benefits both upgraded-gas projects and producers seeking to supply suitable biogas to a nearby user.[10]
URE’s prior consent remains necessary. The reform removes existing approval tests concerning use of available network capacity and unsuccessful attempts to obtain network transmission or distribution. This makes direct supply more accessible without eliminating energy-regulatory authorisation.[9]
A direct pipeline supplies the customer outside the gas system, whereas auction eligibility requires distribution- or transmission-network injection. A standalone pipeline to an industrial user therefore does not, by itself, establish entitlement to auction support.[6]
Transport suppliers cannot stack auction support with NCW compliance
Auction-supported biomethane cannot count towards Poland’s National Indicative Target (NCW) transport-fuel obligation. The government’s explanatory memorandum explicitly extends this restriction from the existing FIP scheme to the auction mechanism.[7]
Producers and fuel suppliers should therefore assess auction support and NCW compliance as alternative revenue sources when structuring offtake agreements. Contract valuations and revenue projections must exclude NCW compliance value for volumes receiving auction support.
Lower delivery requirements reduce penalty exposure for biogas electricity producers
Electricity-auction winners commit to selling a specified volume of electricity. For installations using biomass, biogas or agricultural biogas, the amendment lowers the delivery level below which a shortfall penalty applies from 85% to 65% of that commitment, measured over the applicable settlement period. The new biomethane auctions apply a separate 60% threshold, subject to the statutory settlement rules.[8]
A plant committed to 10,000 MWh that delivers 7,000 MWh would fall below the previous 8,500 MWh threshold but exceed the revised 6,500 MWh threshold, avoiding this particular penalty. For auction-supported biogas combined heat and power (CHP) operators, the benefit is reduced financial exposure when sales fall below forecast. Operators still forgo revenue on undelivered energy; the amendment does not compensate for missing production.
Comparisons between continued electricity generation and conversion to biomethane should therefore incorporate this lower penalty exposure alongside expected revenues and conversion costs.
The immediate implementation sequence contains several distinct milestones. Official publication starts the statutory commencement periods; publication had not been confirmed as of 15 October 2026.[11]
Two additional statutory requirements matter.[6]
Reference-price regulations and URE’s auction rules and announcement will then establish the terms against which projects can prepare final bids.